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Abstract
The British Industrial Revolution triggered a reversal in the social order of so-
ciety whereby the landed elite was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the
middle classes as the economically dominant group. Many observers have linked
this transformation to the contrast in values between a hard-working and frugal
middle class and an upper class imbued with disdain for work. We propose an
economic theory of preference formation where both the divergence of attitudes
across social classes and the ensuing reversal of economic fortunes are equilibrium
outcomes. In our theory, parents shape their childrens preferences in response to
economic incentives. If nancial markets are imperfect, this results in the strat-
ication of society along occupational lines. Middle-class families in occupations
that require e¤ort, skill, and experience develop patience and work ethic, whereas
upper-class families relying on rental income cultivate a rened taste for leisure.
These class-specic attitudes, which are rooted in the nature of pre-industrial pro-
fessions, become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the
economic landscape.
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1 Introduction
The Industrial Revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth. It also set
off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and re-
shaped the distribution of income and wealth. Before the onset of industrialization in
eighteenth-century Britain, wealth and political power were associated with the posses-
sion of land. Over the course of the nineteenth century, a new class of entrepreneurs
and businessmen emerged as the economic elite. For the most part, the members of
this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origin in the urban middle
classes. The landed elite of old was left behind, and eventually lost its political and
economic predominance.
Many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences
in values, attitudes, and ultimately preferences across social classes. There are count-
less examples, both in scholarly and fictional writing, of portrayals of members of the
landowning class as averse to work, unwilling to save, ill-disposed to commercial activ-
ity, and unable to consider money as something to be profitably invested. In contrast,
the new industrialists are described as frugal, thrifty, and hard-working.1
The role of values and culture as determinants of socio-economic change is the subject
of a long-standing debate in the social sciences. Karl Marx regarded economic relation-
ships as the “base of society,” and viewed culture, religion and ideology (the “super-
structure”) as mere reflections of the material interests of the class in control of the means
of production. Max Weber reversed Marx’s perspective, and argued culture and religion
to be key driving forces in the development of modern capitalism. While emphasizing
the effects of culture on economic outcomes, Weber did not advocate a one-sided causal
relationship and suggested, for instance, that the link between economic and religious
factors runs both ways.2
In this paper, we develop a theory of preference formation that is rooted in the rational
1Adam Smith 1776 writes, for instance: “A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in
profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense. The
one often sees his money go from him and return to him again with a profit: the other, when once he parts
with it, very seldom expects to see any more of it” (p. 432). In a study of early industrialists, Crouzet
(1985) cites accounts of the time relating that Mancunian manufacturers of the late eighteenth century “. . .
commenced their careers in business with but slender capitals. . . . Patience, industry and perseverance
was their principal stock” (p. 37).
2“It would also further be necessary to investigate how Protestant Asceticism was in turn influenced
in its development and its character by the totality of social conditions, especially economic . . . it is, of
course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal
interpretation of culture and of history.“(Weber 1905, p. 125)
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choice paradigm, and ask whether such a theory can help explain the socioeconomic
transformation that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. Following Weber’s sugges-
tion in our theory the link between economic conditions and cultural values (or, more
precisely, class-specific preferences) runs both ways. We argue that heterogeneity in
preferences is a key determinant of social change. However, preferences and values
are themselves shaped by the economic conditions that the members of different social
classes face.
In our theory, altruistic parents strive to shape their children’s preferences in a way that
best fits with their future material circumstances. We focus on two key aspects of prefer-
ences: the rate of time preference (patience) and the taste for leisure (or, conversely, work
ethic). Parental investments in patience interact with the steepness of lifetime income
profiles. Lifetime earnings are relatively flat in some professions, while high returns are
achieved only late in life in others, in particular those requiring the acquisition of skills.
A parent’s incentive for investing in a child’s patience increases in the steepness of the
child’s future income profile. Conversely, a child endowed with high patience will be
more likely to enter professions entailing the accumulation of skill and, hence, the delay
of material rewards. Parental investments in their children’s taste for leisure hinge on
the role of labor effort. Parents who expect their children to be wholly reliant on labor
income will tend to instill them with a strong work ethic, i.e., a tolerance for hard work
and a reduced taste for leisure. In contrast, parents who anticipate their children to
be rentiers with ample free time will teach them to appreciate refined leisure activities,
from performing classical music to fox hunting.
The two complementarities in our theory (between patience and steep income profiles
and between the taste for leisure and low work effort) imply that within a given dy-
nasty, the choices of a specific occupation and of preferences suitable for that occupation
are mutually reinforcing over time. As a consequence, even if the population is initially
homogeneous, preferences gradually diverge across the members of different occupa-
tions. Hence, the society is endogenously stratified into “social classes” defined by oc-
cupations and their associated preferences and values. The theory also implies that the
cultural divergence across social classes is related to financial development. If people
can borrow and lend in perfect credit markets to smooth consumption, the link between
occupational choices and consumption profiles is severed. Thus, divergence in patience
across classes only emerges when financial markets are shallow, while financial devel-
opment leads to more homogeneous societies. This prediction accords with the broad
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observation that class differences are less accentuated in modern industrial economies
than in traditional societies.
The theory can account for the reversal in the economic fortunes of different social
classes at the time of the Industrial Revolution. For centuries, members of the pre-
industrial middle class—artisans, craftsmen, and merchants—had to sacrifice consump-
tion and leisure in their youths to acquire skills. Artisans, for instance, could become
prosperous masters of their professions only after undergoing lengthy stages of ap-
prenticeship and journeymanship. We argue that in response to this economic environ-
ment, the middle classes developed a system of values and preferences centered around
parsimony, work ethic, and delay of gratification. For the landed upper class, in con-
trast, neither work ethic nor patience were particularly valuable, because the members
of this class could rely on fairly stable rental incomes from their estates. As a result,
the landowning elite cultivated refined tastes for leisure and grew less future-oriented.
In an otherwise stationary society, such differences in preferences and values had lim-
ited consequences. However, patience and work ethic became a key asset—a “spirit of
capitalism”—when opportunities of economic advancement through entrepreneurship
and investment arose at the outset of the Industrial Revolution. In an already stratified
society, it was members of the patient, hard-working middle class who made the most
of the new opportunities and ultimately gained economic ascendency over the landed
elite.
Our theory thus predicts the triumph of the thrifty and hard-working bourgeoisie at the
outset of the Industrial Revolution. However, this success carries the seed of its own
destruction. Whereas first-generation entrepreneurs started out poor, their descendants
inherited the family business. The founders’ children and grandchildren could thus
rely on considerable capital income, making them less dependent on their own labor
income. Just as for the landowners, this creates an incentive to invest in the appreciation
of leisure: the industrial dynasties ultimately mimic the tastes of the old elite. In the
extreme, this effect can lead to the downfall of a dynasty (the “Buddenbrooks” effect);
at a minimum, the descendants will achieve less growth than the founders.3
Our preference-based explanation for the reversal in fortune of different social classes
during the Industrial Revolution is consistent with a number of observations on the so-
3The increasing leisure taste is counteracted by increasing patience, because investing in a family busi-
ness steepens intra- and intergenerational consumption profiles. If only the taste for leisure was endoge-
nous, the ultimate downfall of an industrial dynasty would be unavoidable. Endogenous patience is
therefore central for explaining the reversal of fortunes between the middle and upper classes.
3
cial history of Britain. We document that well before industrialization, members of the
upper class displayed a low propensity to save and accumulated debt, which is consis-
tent with low patience. In addition, we observe diverging attitudes to work and leisure
over time between the upper and middle class. At a time when the upper-class leisure
culture grew ever more sophisticated, the urban middle class embraced values of hard
work and frugality. Economic success and wealth accumulation became the creed of
the ascending bourgeoisie. The perhaps most telling observation is that once economic
success was achieved, middle-class culture started to change once again. From the mid-
nineteenth century, the traditional middle-class work ethic gave way to an increased
taste for leisure and an imitation of traditionally upper-class habits. This gentrifica-
tion process ultimately lowered class barriers to the point where intermarriage between
members of aristocratic and industrial dynasties became common fare.
Although we do not focus explicitly on religion, religious instruction may have been
a tool for transmitting economically advantageous values from one generation to the
next. In this respect, our theory is related to Weber’s view that the spirit of capitalism
was related to the values of the protestant reformation. Protestant values, and espe-
cially Puritanism, were widespread among the urban upper-middle classes and may
have been instrumental in their economic advancement. Our theory would suggest that
Puritanism was successful among certain groups precisely because Puritan values were
compatible with their economic conditions. The theory also suggests that changing eco-
nomic conditions should affect the success and popularity of religion. This is in line
with Weber’s discussion of the secularizing influence of wealth. Citing John Wesley,
Weber argues that economic enrichment may bring about a loss of religious fervor, in-
dustry, and frugality and their replacement with a “love of the world in all its branches,”
including “the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life” (p. 173).
In the following section, we relate our work to the existing literature. In Section 3 we
analyze the decision problem at the heart of our theory in partial equilibrium. In Sec-
tion 4, we embed the choice problem in a general-equilibrium model of a pre-industrial
economy and discuss the transition of the economy after the Industrial Revolution. His-
torical evidence and alternative theories are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, and Section 7
concludes. All proofs are contained in the mathematical appendix which is available
online.
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2 Related Literature
Our work contributes to the recent literature on the economics of the Industrial Rev-
olution (see Galor and Weil 2000, Hansen and Prescott 2002, Doepke 2004, and Clark
2007). As we do, Clark views changing values and preferences as a key element of
the transition from a Malthusian era to a modern society: “As a whole these changes
show societies becoming increasingly middle class in their orientation. Thrift, pru-
dence, negotiation and hard work were imbuing themselves into communities that had
been spendthrift, violent, impulsive and leisure loving. (p.208)”. However, following
Galor and Moav (2002), Clark (2007) emphasizes genetic selection rather than conscious
investment as the mechanism for preference formation (see also Clark and Hamilton
2006 and Galor and Michalopoulos 2006). We view selection and investment in prefer-
ences as complementary approaches, because they operate on different time scales and
lead to distinct implications. The evolutionary literature is concerned with changes in
the composition of genetic traits that affect entire populations and take place over long
time horizons. Galor and Moav (2002), for instance, argue that selection pressures which
generated preferences favorable for economic growth have been operating at least since
the Neolithic Revolution nearly 10,000 years ago. In contrast, our focus is on the diver-
gence of preferences across social classes, and our mechanism operates at a time scale
from two or three generations (the “Buddenbrooks” effect) to at most a few centuries.
Our paper provides a new perspective of the effects of wealth inequality on develop-
ment in the face of financial market imperfections. A number of existing theories point
out that if financial markets are absent, poor individuals may be unable to finance oth-
erwise profitable investment projects, and are therefore forced to enter less productive
professions (see Banerjee and Newman 1993, Galor and Zeira 1993, and Matsuyama
2006). A common feature of this literature is that the rich, who are least constrained
by credit market imperfections, generally do best and are the first beneficiaries of new
investment opportunities. Therefore, these theories cannot explain how a new class of
entrepreneurs rose from humble beginnings to leapfrog over the landed pre-industrial
elite, at a time when wealth inequality was quite extreme and financial markets shallow
by modern standards.
Our theory is also related to a recent literature on the effects of religious values on eco-
nomic performance and the income distribution. Using international survey data, Barro
and McCleary (2003) find that economic growth responds positively to the beliefs in hell
and heaven. One interpretation of this finding is that a habit of contemplating the dis-
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tant future generates individual behavior favorable for economic performance. Similar
findings are documented by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003).4 In a different vein,
Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2006a, and 2006b) argue that Jews originally specialized in
artisanship, trade, and finance because of religious reforms that fostered literacy among
Jewish farmers. After the reforms, Jews progressively migrated to towns to exploit their
comparative advantage in education in skilled urban occupations. Thus, as in our the-
ory, group-specific values and attitudes have long-lasting effects on economic decisions.
However, the impetus in Botticini and Eckstein is a cultural shock to a particular group
(a reform in the Jewish religion), while our mechanism relies entirely on economic incen-
tives faced by an initially homogeneous population. Turning more specifically to We-
ber’s hypothesis, Becker and Woessmann (2007) find that in nineteenth-century Prussia
Protestant counties were more prosperous than Catholic ones. However, the effect of
religion disappears when one controls for education, suggesting that values affect eco-
nomic performance mainly through the accumulation of human capital. Although we
do not model religion explicitly, our theory is consistent with this view.
The notion of patience as an asset that agents can invest in was first introduced in
the economic literature by Becker and Mulligan (1997), who consider the problem of
a consumer who lives for a finite number of periods and makes a one-time choice of
a discount factor. In contrast, we embed the choice of patience in a dynamic model
of preference formation with the additional dimensions of choosing an occupation and
investing into the taste for leisure. Moreover, we analyze the evolution of preferences
in an environment with imperfect capital markets, which is a key factor for our results
on the stratification of preferences as well as the application of the model to the Indus-
trial Revolution.5 An alternative mechanism of preference transmission is advocated by
the literature on cultural transmission (see Bisin and Verdier 2000 and 2001, Ferna´ndez,
Fogli, and Olivetti 2004, Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002, and Saez-Marti and Zenou 2006).
As in our work, parents’ incentives for forming their children’s preferences depend on
4According to the calibration analysis of Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao (2007), differences in religious
affiliation can explain some of the differences in the timing and diffusion of the Industrial Revolution
across countries.
5Also related are Mulligan (1997), where parents choose their own level of altruism towards their
children, and Haaparanta and Puhakka (2003), where agents invest in their own patience and in health.
Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) focus on the negative effects of public transfers on parents’ incentives to
instill a work ethic in their children. The macroeconomic consequences of inherited (as opposed to chosen)
preferences have been examined by de la Croix and Michel (1999, 2001) and Artige, Camacho, and de la
Croix (2004). In the latter paper, inherited consumption habits can lead to the downfall of a temporarily
wealthy country or region.
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economic conditions. However, parents invest because they desire to make their chil-
dren’s behavior conform with their own wishes. In our dynastic model, parents judge
their children’s choices solely through the children’s own eyes; preference formation is
a gift that altruistic parents pass on to their children.
If patience and the work ethic are accumulated and transmitted within dynasties, par-
ents’ and children’s propensities to save and invest should be positively correlated.
This implication is confirmed by Knowles and Postlewaite (2004), who show that in
the PSID parental savings behavior is an important determinant of their children’s ed-
ucation and savings choices, after controlling for a variety of individual characteristics
(see also Charles and Hurst 2003, who study the correlation of wealth between parents
and children). Moreover, the correlation is stronger between children and mothers, who
are usually more involved in a in child’s upbringing than fathers. Our theory also posits
that agents with steeper income profiles are more patient. This is consistent with the
results of a field experiment conducted on Danish households by Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) showing that time discount rates of highly educated adults (who tend
to have steeper income profiles) are about one third lower than those of adults with less
education.6
Reyes-Garcia et al. (2007) study the effect of patience on economic outcomes among
the Tsimanes, an Amazonian tribal society that only recently transitioned from self-
sufficiency to a market economy. They find that more patient individuals were sub-
sequently more likely to acquire formal education, choose market-oriented occupations,
and earn higher income (see also Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1992). A recent em-
pirical literature highlights the role of a broader set of non-cognitive skills, including
both patience and work ethic, for economic performance (see Heckman and Rubinstein
2001, Segal 2004, and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006). Coleman and Hoffer (1983)
argue that the emphasis on patience and self-discipline is the key to the effectiveness of
Catholic schools in the United States. This literature also shows that non-cognitive skills
depend on nurture and family upbringing.7
6Other evidence of a positive correlation between steep income profiles and patience includes Carroll
and Summers (1991), who document that in both Japan and the United States consumption-age profiles
are steeper when economic growth is high, and Becker and Mulligan (1997), who show that consumption
growth is high for adults who either have income themselves (which is associated with steep income
profiles) or who had rich parents.
7See in particular Heckman (2000) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003), who review the evidence from a
large number of programs targeting disadvantaged children. Similar conclusions are reached by studies in
child development psychology such as Goleman (1995), Shonkoff and Philips (2000), and Taylor, McGue,
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3 A Model of Occupational Choice and Endogenous
Preference Formation
In this section, we develop a theory of endogenous preference formation that is driven
by parents’ desire to instill certain tastes into their children. The parents’ efforts in rais-
ing their children respond to economic incentives; as a consequence, preference for-
mation interacts with other economic decisions taken by both parent and child. Our
particular focus is on the question of how preferences both determine and depend on
the choice of an occupation.
We concentrate on two dimensions of preferences, the taste for leisure and patience.
Investments in the taste for leisure comprise all parental efforts that cultivate a child’s
ability to enjoy free (non-working) time. Examples are teaching one’s child to swim, to
play a sport, to ride a horse, or to play a musical instrument. Since a high appreciation of
leisure raises the opportunity cost of working, parental efforts in the opposite direction
(those that lower the taste for leisure) can be interpreted as increasing a child’s tolerance
for hard work. Parents may achieve this objective by preaching the virtues of an austere
life.8 Investments in patience determine the weight that a child attaches, in adult age,
to utility late in life relative to the present. Instilling parsimony and thrift into children
are examples of this type of investment. Religious ideas stressing the value of frugality
and industry—the “protestant ethics” of Max Weber—can also be regarded as vehicles
for the accumulation of patience and the work ethic.
We first describe the model, and then analyze the dynamic individual choice problem.
We model patience and the taste for leisure as state variables for the members of a dy-
nasty. We show that, unlike in standard models, the value functions are convex in the
state variables. This is due to choice complementarities between investments in prefer-
ences and occupational choices as well as labor supply decisions. Despite the convexity
of the value functions, we can characterize the solution of the choice problem through a
recursive formulation with well-defined policy functions. With an eye to our historical
application, we separately analyze the decision problem of agents who rely on wage
income alone (such as workers or artisans) and agents who also receive rents (such as
landowners).
and Iacono (2000). Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006) document strong evidence (based on the
German Socio-Economic Panel) that trust and risk attitudes are transmitted from parents to children.
8Formally, we only model parental investments in a child’s taste for leisure; a parent who wishes to
improve a child’s work ethic would simply do little or none of this investment.
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3.1 Preferences, Timing, and Occupations
Our model economy is populated by overlapping generations of altruistic people who
live for four periods, two as children and two as adults. People work throughout both
adult periods (young and old), and their earnings may vary over time. Agents consume
and make economic decisions only when they are adult. At the beginning of adulthood,
every agent gives birth to a single child.
All adults have the same basic preferences. However, two aspects of the preferences are
endogenous, namely patience (the relative weight of old versus young adult consump-
tion in utility) and the taste for leisure (the marginal utility of free time). These taste
parameters are determined during an agent’s childhood as a result of her parent’s child-
rearing effort (investment in preferences). Once an agent reaches adulthood, preferences
no longer change. An adult therefore takes her own preferences as given, but gets to
shape her child’s tastes.
Agents are altruistic towards their children. In addition, their utility depends on con-
sumption, leisure, and investment in preferences in each of the two adult periods (see
the time line in Figure 1). More formally, a young adult’s lifetime utility is given by:
(1−B) (log (c1) + A (1− n1)− lA,1 − lB,1) +B (log (c2) + A (1− n2)− lA,2 − lB,2)
+ z Vchild(A
′(lA, A), B′(lB, B)). (1)
Here A denotes the taste for leisure, and B denotes patience. The first row of (1) is the
adult’s felicity: c1 and c2 denote consumption, n1 and n2 labor supply, and lA,1, lA,2, lB,1,
and lB,2 the effort choices for investing in the child’s taste for leisure and patience. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the investments in preferences are only productive
if sustained at the same level over the two adult periods. Thus, lA,1 = lA,2 = lA and lB,1 =
lB,2 = lB. The second row of (1) is the altruistic component: Vchild represents the child’s
maximized utility as a function of its preference parameters, as chosen by the parent.
A′(lA, A) and B′(lB, B) are the “production functions” for the child’s preferences, which
take the form:
A′(lA, A) = ψA¯+ (1− ψ)A+ g(lA), (2)
B′(lB, B) = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f(lB), (3)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant depreciation rate and f and g are non-negative increasing
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functions. A¯ and B¯ represent the innate levels of the taste for leisure and patience, i.e.,
the steady states of A and B in the absence of any investment. The intergenerational
persistence of preferences captures the notion that, to some extent, children learn by
imitating parental attitudes. Thus, part of the parents’ preferences are transmitted ef-
fortlessly to the child. The parental effort is bounded, lA ∈ [0, l¯A] and lB ∈ [0, l¯B]. Also,
we normalize the time endowment to unity, n1 ∈ [0, 1] and n2 ∈ [0, 1] and impose the
following restrictions.
Assumption 1 The function f : [0, l¯B] → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, and weakly
concave, and g : [0, l¯A] → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. More-
over, g(0) = f(0) = 0 and f(l¯B) ≤ ψ
(
1− B¯). The parameters z and ψ satisfy 0 < z < 1 and
0 < ψ < 1.
The assumptions imply the upper bounds for the preference parameters Amax ≡ A¯ +
g(l¯A)/ψ and Bmax ≡ B¯ + f(l¯B)/ψ ≤ 1.
3.2 Wage Earners
We first describe outcomes for agents who rely exclusively on labor income. In our
historical application this will correspond to the landless classes, such as workers and
artisans. In addition to choosing labor supply and investing in preferences, these agents
choose an occupation. An occupation i is characterized by a wage (or labor productiv-
ity) profile {w1,i, w2,i}, where w1,i and w2,i are strictly positive and w2,i ≥ w1,i (due to a
premium to experience and human capital). There is a finite number I of occupations
to choose from. Occupations are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, and ordered according to
the steepness of the wage profile. Without loss of generality, we ignore occupations
featuring a dominated profile.
Assumption 2 The productivity profiles satisfy w2,i ≥ w1,i > 0 for all i. Moreover, a higher
index denotes a steeper productivity profile, i.e., j > i implies w1,j < w1,i and w2,j > w2,i.
Since parents are altruistic towards their children and preferences are time consistent,
the decision problem can be given a dynastic interpretation, where the head of the dy-
nasty makes decisions for all subsequent generations.9 In this section, we analyze the
9Note that discounting across generations is not a choice variable and depends on the exogenous al-
truism parameter z. It could be argued that investments in patience also affect altruism (i.e., z may be
endogenous). Such a model would lead to qualitatively similar results, but the change would come at the
cost of a loss of analytical tractability.
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problem in partial equilibrium, taking the productivity profiles {w1,i, w2,i} as exogenous
and time invariant. In Section 4, we will extend the analysis to a general-equilibrium
economy where the wage profiles are endogenously determined.
The development of financial markets plays an important role in our analysis. For now,
we assume that financial markets are absent, i.e., households cannot borrow or lend
to smooth out consumption. Hence, consumption is equal to income in each period,
c1 = w1,in1 and c2 = w2,in2, and the preference parameters A and B are the only state
variables for a dynasty. Later on, we will discuss the effects of financial development.
A young adult’s choice problem can be represented by the following Bellman equation:
V (A,B) = max
i∈I,lA,lB ,n1,n2
{
(1−B) (log(w1,in1) + A(1− n1))
+B (log(w2,in2) + A(1− n2))− lA − lB + z V (A′, B′)
}
(4)
subject to (2) and (3). Our decision problem is a dynamic programming problem with
two state variables on the compact state space [A¯, Amax] × [B¯, Bmax]. Standard recursive
arguments imply that the Bellman equation (4) has a unique solution. SinceA is constant
over an individual’s life, the optimal choice of labor supply in (4) is constant as well, i.e.,
n1 = n2 = n. This observation leads to a useful result: the problems of investing in
patience and in the taste for leisure are separable.
Lemma 1 The value function V is additively separable in its arguments, V (A,B) = vA (A) +
vB (B) where:
vA(A) = max
lA,n
{log(n) + A(1− n)− lA + z vA(A′)} , (5)
vB(B) = max
i∈I,lB
{(1−B) (log(w1,i)) +B (log(w2,i))− lB + z vB(B′)} , (6)
subject to, respectively, (2) and (3).
Lemma 1 implies that as long as wages are the only source of income, the occupational
choice does not interact with the investment in the taste for leisure, so that we can an-
alyze the problems of investing in patience and in the taste for leisure separately.10 We
10The additive separability of the value function hinges on logarithmic utility. Since logarithmic util-
ity is a common assumption in problems with endogenous labor supply, our analysis provides a useful
tractable benchmark. The solution can be characterized under more general preferences if one abstracts
from investment in the taste for leisure, see Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
11
start by characterizing the value function vB(B), which reflects both the investment in
patience and the choice of an occupation. The policy function for the investment in
patience is denoted lB (B).
Proposition 1 The value function vB is non-decreasing, convex, and piece-wise linear. The
steepness of the optimal wage profile, w2,i/w1,i, is non-decreasing in B, and the optimal invest-
ment in patience lB = lB (B) is non-decreasing in B. Over the interior of any interval for B
on which vB is linear, the occupational choice of each member of the dynasty (i.e., parent, child,
grandchild and so on) is constant and unique (though possibly different across generations), and
lB(B) is constant and generically single-valued. Each kink in the value function corresponds
to a switch to an occupation with a steeper income profile by a present or future member of the
dynasty. At a kink, the optimal choices of occupation and lB corresponding to both adjoining
intervals are optimal. Thus, the optimal policy function is a non-decreasing step function, which
takes multiple values only at a step.
The value and policy functions are visualized in Figure 2. That vB is non-decreasing
follows from the assumption that the wage profile is non-decreasing. In particular, if
for sufficiently low patience all members of a dynasty choose an occupation with a flat
income profile (w1 = w2), the value function is constant in that range. This corresponds
to the interval [B¯, B1] in Figure 2. Within this range, the value function is flat (upper
panel), and agents do not invest in patience (lower panel). As soon as B is sufficiently
large (B > B1), a current or future member of the dynasty finds choosing a profession
with w2 > w1 optimal, and the value function becomes strictly increasing in B.
The convexity of vB follows from a complementarity between patience and the choice
of steep income profiles. To gain intuition, consider first the decision problem without
an occupational choice, that is, with a fixed occupation {w1, w2}. If we vary the initial
generation’s B while holding the investment choice lB constant over all generations,
utility is a linear function of B (as depicted by the dotted line in the upper panel of
Figure 2). Moreover, given the fixed income profile, choosing a constant lB is optimal:
the marginal return to investing in patience in a given period is given by z log(w2/w1),
which does not depend on B. Generalizing from this observation, the value function is
linear over any range of B such that it is optimal for the current and future members of
a dynasty to hold the occupational choice constant. In general, however, occupational
choices are not fixed. Given thatB is the relative weight on utility late in life, it is optimal
to choose an occupation with a steep wage profile (large i) when B is high, and one
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yielding a flat profile when B is low. As we increase B, the slope of the value function
increases discretely every time either a current or a future member of the dynasty finds
switching into a profession with a steeper profile optimal, resulting in a convex value
function.
In the upper panel of Figure 2, the true value function is represented by the solid line; the
points B1 and B2 are thresholds where either the current or a future occupation changes.
At each of the kinks, some member of the dynasty is indifferent between (at least) two
different profiles. As depicted in the lower panel of Figure 2, the optimal lB increases at
each step, because the marginal benefit of being patient increases with the steepness of
the wage profile. Since the choice of lB depends on the chosen income profile, there may
be multiple optimal choices of lB at a B where the value function has a kink, whereas in
between kinks the optimal choice of lB is unique.
Proposition 1 allows us to characterize the equilibrium law of motion for patience. Since
the policy correspondence lB (B) is monotone, the dynamics of B are also monotone and
converge to a steady state from any initial condition.11
Proposition 2 The law of motion of patience capital is described by the following difference
equation:
B′ = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f (lB (B)) ,
where lB (B) is a non-decreasing step function (as described in Proposition 1). Generically, for
any initial condition B0 the dynasty converges to a steady state with constant B where parents
and children choose the same profession. The steady-state levels of B and lB are increasing in the
steepness of the steady-state income profile. Multiple steady states are possible.
Since Bt converges to a steady state, there must be a time T such that the occupational
choice of all members of a dynasty is constant from T onwards. The dynamics of B are
particularly simple once the occupational choice is constant. Since the law of motion
is given by Bt+1 = ψB¯ + (1 − ψ)Bt + f(lssB ), patience converges to a steady state given
by Bss = B¯ + f(lssB )/ψ. However, the steady state does not have to be unique, even for
a given B0. For example, if the initial generation is indifferent between two different
occupations, the steady state can depend on which one is chosen.
11 If the production function for patience f(lB) is linear, in knife-edge economies (i.e., in a zero-measure
subset of the parameter space) the policy correspondence is not single-valued even in between steps.
Convergence in terms of occupational choice is still guaranteed, but dynasties may be indifferent between
multiple patience levels. In generic economies, lB(B) is single valued even in the linear case.
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We established so far that members of different professions face different incentives for
investing in patience, provided that the steepness of income profiles differs across pro-
fessions. A key assumption underlying this result is that access to financial markets is
limited. The incentive to invest in patience is determined not by the income profile per
se, but by the lifetime profile of period-by-period utilities. If agents were able to bor-
row and lend within each cohort at a fixed interest rate, the interaction of patience and
occupational choices would be severed: first, only occupations maximizing the present
value of the lifetime wage profile would be chosen in equilibrium; second, since the
household could freely allocate income among the two adult periods, the choice of a
profession would have no bearing on the incentives to invest in patience. Put differ-
ently, at least some financial market imperfections are necessary for occupational choice
and investments in patience to be interlinked.12
A positive implication of this finding is that the degree of preference heterogeneity in
a population depends on the development of financial markets. In an economy where
financial markets are mostly absent, incentives to invest in patience vary widely across
members of different professions, and consequently we would expect to observe a large
corresponding variation in actual acquired preferences. These differences should be
smaller in modern economies with less imperfect financial markets.13
Consider, next, the problem of investing in the taste for leisure, as described by the
maximization problem (5). The following proposition characterizes the value and policy
functions vA(A) and lA(A).
Proposition 3 The value function vA is non-decreasing and convex. Optimal labor supply is
given by:
n = min{A−1, 1}. (7)
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = lA (A) is non-decreasing in A.
12It is not necessary, however, to assume the complete absence of financial markets, as we do for an-
alytical convenience. As long as the steepness of an income profile is at least partially transmitted to
utility profiles, the basic mechanism is at work. The assumption of complete financial markets is rou-
tinely rejected even in contemporary data from industrial economies, see, e.g., Card, Chetty, and Weber
(2007).
13For example, although engaging in a lengthy program of study (such as medical school) that leads
to high future incomes may still require some patience and perseverance, today’s students have access
to educational loans and credit cards. Hence, the modern-day artisans are able to consume some of their
future rewards already in the present, and consequently they (and their parents) face a smaller incentive
to invest in specialized preferences.
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More specifically, the value function is strictly increasing over any range of A where
leisure is positive, i.e., n < 1 or, given (7), A > 1. The convexity of the value function
is once again due to a complementarity between preferences and economic decisions
befitting these preferences. The value function would be linear in A if people could not
adjust their labor supply when A changes. However, people do adjust n (they work
less when A increases), and the value function is thus convex. Unlike the choice of
an occupation, n is a continuous variable, implying that the value function is strictly
convex, except in ranges where the n is at a corner. The characterization of vA leads to
the following results regarding the equilibrium law of motion.
Proposition 4 The law of motion of the taste for leisure is described by the following difference
equation:
A′ = ψA¯+ (1− ψ)A+ g (lA (A)) .
Given an initial condition A0 the dynasty converges monotonically to a steady state with con-
stant A.
Multiple steady states are possible, depending on the parameterization of g. However,
cross-dynasty differences in the taste for leisure can only arise from differences in initial
conditions. If all dynasties start with the same A, they remain identical along this pref-
erence dimension. The incentive to invest into the taste for leisure depends entirely on
the amount of leisure enjoyed by future members of the dynasty.
3.3 Rentiers
We now consider the choice problem for agents earning rents. In our historical analysis
this will correspond to the landowners. Unlike the landless wage earners, the landown-
ers in our economy will not have to choose an occupation, because their income is pro-
vided by inherited land. However, they still have to make decisions on patience and
leisure preference.
We denote the rent accruing per unit of land by r, and amount of land owned by a given
landowner by x. In order to appropriate the entire rent, landowners have to monitor the
workers on their land. The landowners’ budget constraints are
c1 = rx+ (r − r)xn1 and c2 = rx+ (r − r) xn2,
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where n1 and n2 denote the monitoring effort (in units of time) in the two periods. Even
without monitoring (the proverbial “absent landlord”), the landowner owns a minimum
return r on the land. By setting n = 1, landowners can appropriate the entire rent.
Enjoying leisure entails a linear income loss. The return to monitoring is a reduced-form
representation of moral hazard problems, such as the possibility that administrators
steal a part of the rent. The key feature of this income process is that total income is less
elastic with respect to labor effort than the income of pure wage earners.
Since the income profile is flat, optimal labor supply is constant, and the value function
is independent of B. Thus, landowners do not invest in patience, and their investment
and labor supply problem can be written as:
V L(A,B) = vLA(A) = max
lA,n
{(log(rx+ (r − r)xn) + A(1− n))− lA + z vLA(A′)}, (8)
subject to (2).
Proposition 5 The value function vLA is non-decreasing and convex. Optimal labor supply is
given by
n = min
{
A−1 − r
r − r , 1
}
. (9)
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = lLA (A) is non-decreasing in A. Given an initial
condition A0 the dynasty converges monotonically to a steady state with constant A, which is
higher than the steady-state A for pure wage earners (as described in Proposition 4).
These results are parallel to Propositions 3 and 4, except that labor supply is lower than
in the case of pure wage income, and decreasing in the ratio of the pure rent to the
return to effort. This feeds back into the investment decision: parents whose children
have more time for leisure invest more in the children’s taste for leisure. Note that
the incentives for landowners to supply labor and invest in the taste for leisure do not
depend on the size of their estate, x: in steady state the entire class of landowners will
have identical preferences. Over time, landowning dynasties earning rents will develop
a higher taste for leisure (i.e., a lower work ethic) than dynasties relying on labor income
only.
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4 Preference Formation and the Industrial Revolution
4.1 The Pre-industrial Equilibrium
Up to this point the level of income derived in each profession has been taken as ex-
ogenous. In this section, we endogenize wages and rental rates. We show that general
equilibrium forces can induce dynasties to sort into different professions even in an
economy where initially everyone has the same preferences. If these professions differ
in the steepness of their income profiles, divergence in patience necessarily follows.
We construct a simple model of a pre-industrial economy that relies on two modes of
production: agriculture and artisanship. Agricultural output YF and the artisans’ pro-
duction YM are perfect substitutes, so that total output is given by Y = YF + YM . The
two technologies differ in terms of the inputs used. The agricultural technology uses
unskilled labor L and land Z, and is described by the following production function:
YF = L
αZ1−α, (10)
where α ∈ (0, 1). The artisan technology is linear in skilled labor H :
YM = qH, (11)
where q is a productivity parameter. Both sectors are competitive, so that factors are paid
their marginal product. The total amount of land is fixed at Z = 1. Land is not traded
and is owned by a fixed measure of dynasties, each of whom owns an equal share x of
land. The rents accruing to landowners depends on x and on their monitoring effort as
discussed in the previous section. Each landowner bequeaths the land he owns to his
child when he passes away. There is no occupational mobility between landowners and
the other classes. The mass of landless labor-market participants (workers and artisans)
is equal to one in every period.
The main difference between skilled and unskilled labor is the lifetime income profile.
Recall that in equilibrium, all individuals relying only on labor income supply the same
amount of labor n in both periods of their lives. An unskilled worker is equally efficient
at young and at old age, and therefore supplies an equal number n of units of unskilled
labor in both adult periods. Skilled workers (i.e., artisans), in contrast, use some of the
young adult period to acquire skills and experience. Their effective labor supply is given
by n units of skilled labor in the first adult period and by γn units in the second adult
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period, where γ > 1. Hence, artisans have a steep lifetime income profile, whereas the
workers’ profile is flat.
Suppose that initially the productivity q of artisanship is so low that only the agricultural
technology is used. As a consequence, all landless agents are workers with flat income
profiles. Patience is not a valuable asset in such an economy, and remains at the natural
level B¯. Then, the productivity of artisanship q increases unexpectedly, so that all work-
ers remaining in agriculture is no longer an equilibrium. Thus, adults will endogenously
divide between the two occupations, and wages will adjust to make everyone just in-
different between being a worker and being an artisan. Thereafter, further stratification
in preferences across social classes necessarily follows. In general, the transition can be
complicated if the fractions of workers and artisans (and hence wages) change over time.
Here we focus on equilibria such that, after the initial sorting, the number of workers
and artisans remains constant and the wages are time invariant.14 More formally, let µ
be the aggregate labor supply in agriculture (that is, the fraction of workers among the
landless adults multiplied by individual labor supply) after the sorting. Workers then
earn a wage equal to wF = αµα−1 in both periods, whereas artisans earn q in the first
and γq in the second period. If wF is constant over time, the analysis of the preceding
section applies directly to the decision problem in the general-equilibrium economy.15
The main feature of this equilibrium is that occupational segregation triggers divergence
in patience across worker and artisan dynasties. After the investment choice of the first
generation, all members of the artisans dynasties are more patient than workers and
strictly prefer to be artisans. The taste for leisure is not affected by the occupational
choice, because the members of both occupations continue to rely exclusively on labor
income. Thus, the theory predicts no sorting across workers and artisans along this di-
mension of preferences, and both groups continue to work the same number of hours.16
In an equilibrium with constant employment shares, landowners do not invest in pa-
tience, and converge to the natural patience B¯. However, landowners invest more than
14This focus is consistent with the observation that factor prices varied little in the pre-industrial econ-
omy. Clark (2007) shows that the wage of craftsmen relative to laborers in Britain were about constant
between 1400 and 1800 (Figure 9.4). During the same period, land rents were a roughly constant share of
income (Figure 7.4).
15An equilibrium with constant wages only exist for a subset of the admissible parameter set. A set of
sufficient conditions is provided in the online technical appendix.
16This is consistent with the evidence presented by Voth (2000), who documents that the number of
hours worked by workers and artisans in the pre-industrial era were approximately the same. See also
the discussion in Section 5.
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artisans and workers in the taste for leisure, so that their taste for leisure converges to a
higher steady state.
To summarize, the members of the three occupations in our pre-industrial economy
all end up with different preferences, shaped in each case by the economic conditions
characterizing the profession. Both workers and artisans are hard-working, because
they rely exclusively on labor income. Artisans are more patient than workers, however,
because they also face a steep lifetime income profile. The landowners face an income
profile that is equally flat as that of the workers, and they consequently have the same
low patience. Unlike the workers, the landowners derive their income mostly from
land instead of labor. As a consequence, the landowners develop a higher taste for
leisure (or conversely a greater aversion to work) than the landless classes. In the pre-
industrial economy, this stratification of preferences is only important to the extent that
it determines occupational choices. We now turn to the question how the fate of the
different classes in our economy evolves when technological change alters the economic
landscape.
4.2 From Artisan to Capitalist
We model industrialization by introducing a new technology that increases the produc-
tivity of savings and investments. The new technology becomes unexpectedly available
after preferences have already diverged across classes. The class-specific preferences,
which were formed in response to economic conditions in the pre-industrial period, also
turn out to determine the extent to which members of different classes make use of the
new technology. The basic result is unsurprising in the light of standard economic the-
ory: the most patient and hardest-working classes, i.e., the artisans, are the first to take
advantage of the new opportunity—they possess the “spirit of capitalism.” The artisans
leapfrog over the landowning class, and replace them as the economic elite. However,
preferences continue to evolve after the introduction of the new technology. To some
extent, this process can mitigate the subsequent divergence of wealth across classes. In
particular, as the new industrialists accumulate wealth, they also start accumulating a
taste for leisure. As a result, the children and grandchildren of the first industrialists are
less economically successful as the founding generation.
After the introduction of the new technology, each dynasty faces a decision problem
with three state variables: leisure taste A, patience B, and capital K. We interpret the
capital variable as a family-owned enterprise. Young adults decide how much of their
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first-period income to consume and how much to invest into the family business. Invest-
ments in the business are assumed to be irreversible: agents can consume the output of
the investment echnology (as well as their labor and land-rent income), but the capital
stock itself cannot be liquidated and turned into consumption. The capital owned by
an old agent is bequeathed—up to depreciation—to her child.17 We continue to assume
that agents cannot borrow.
The capital stock of the family business depreciates at the rate δ. The rate of return on
capital depends on labor effort and is denoted by R(n). Here the return is increasing in
n, i.e., a hard-working entrepreneur earns a higher return than a passive owner. This
captures the role of managerial effort and monitoring in a business and is parallel to our
treatment of rental income from land. The return is given by:
R(n) = R + (R−R)nη,
where R > R > 0 and 0 < η < 1.18 We also assume that the business activity is run in
addition to one of the existing professions. Thus, a young entrepreneur can derive ad-
ditional labor income as a worker or artisan, or in the case of landowners, entrepreneur-
ship can be combined with rental income from land. This feature, together with the
absence of any fixed cost, allows businesses to be started at a small scale on top of other
activities. In particular, we want to allow aristocrats to earn rents from their land and in-
vest the proceeds in a capital market, so as to not exclude them from investment from the
outset. For simplicity, we assume that a single effort choice determines labor or rental
income as well as the return on the family business (separating these choice variables
would complicate the notation without changing the main results).
Let K ≥ 0 denote the bequest of capital received by a young adult. The budget con-
17Dynastic enterprises were common in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Caselli and Gen-
naioli (2003) argue that this was due to the underdevelopment of financial markets: it was unprofitable
for parents to liquidate their business instead of leaving it to the children. In our model, the irreversibil-
ity constraint implies that differences in investment across families lead to different initial assets for the
next generation. Under reversible investment, similar results could be obtained if the altruism parameter
z (the intergenerational discount factor) was an increasing function of patience B (the intragenerational
discount factor).
18The curvature in the return function is not essential for the results, but is useful to generate a smooth
relationship between state variables and the entrepreneurial return in the simulations below.
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straints and the irreversibility constraint are given by:
c1 +K
′ = (1− δ +R(n1,i))K + y1, (12)
c2 = R(n2,i)K
′ + y2, (13)
K ′ ≥ (1− δ)K. (14)
Here y1 and y2 denote income derived outside the family business. For workers and
artisans, this consists of labor income (y1 = w1,in1,i and y2 = w2,in2,i), whereas aristocrats
receive the rents from their land x as a function of their monitoring effort (y1 = rx +
(r − r)xn1 and y2 = rx + (r − r) xn2). In the budget constraint (12) for the first adult
period, total income consists of y1 plus capital income (1 − δ + R(n1,i))K. Because of
the irreversibility constraint (14), consumption cannot exceed the sum of current output
and labor income: c1 ≤ R(n1,i)K. In the second-period budget constraint (13), the agent
earns y2 plus capital income R(n2,i)K ′. Since the capital stock cannot be liquidated, the
agent bequeaths the remaining capital (1− δ)K ′ to her child. 19
The recursive representation of the decision problem of a young adult with leisure pref-
erence A, patience B, and inherited capital stock K is given by the following Bellman
equation:
V (A,B,K) = max
c1,c2,lA,lB ,n1,n2
{
(1−B) (log(c1) + A(1− n1)) +B (log(c2) + A(1− n2))
− lA − lB + z V (A′, B′, (1− δ)K ′)
}
where the maximization is subject to the laws of motion for A and B (2) and (3), and the
budget and irreversibility constraints (12), (13), and (14). Moreover, the choice variables
are bounded by c1, c2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ n1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ lA ≤ l¯A, and 0 ≤ lB ≤ l¯B.
The separation result of Lemma 1 no longer applies in the presence of capital, and the
equilibrium law of motion of A B and K are interdependent. This prevents a full an-
alytical characterization, and the model must be solved numerically. Nevertheless, the
basic tradeoffs that determine investment in preferences are still the same, so that, at
19In principle, parents could bequeath additional resources to their offspring. However, we focus on
economies where the irreversibility of the capital stock is a binding constraint for the old adults. Namely,
in the last period of their lives agents would like to liquidate part of the capital stock and consume it, but
they are instead forced to leave it to their children as an involuntary bequest. Agents clearly do not leave
any additional bequests in such economies. Formally, this outcome can be guaranteed by choosing the
altruism factor z appropriately.
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least qualitatively, the interaction of capital accumulation and preference formulation is
easily understood.
First, consider how preferences determine the investment choice. Here a standard Eu-
ler equation applies: a young adult invests if future marginal utilities weighted by the
appropriate time discount factors and investment returns exceed the cost of investing,
i.e., current marginal utility. Thus, unsurprisingly, more patient agents have a higher
propensity to invest. In addition, agents with a low taste for leisure also tend to invest
more, since by working harder they earn a higher return on their investment. If we ap-
ply these findings to our economic environment, it follows that the artisans are, at least
initially, the ideal investors, because they are both patient and hard-working. The other
classes either invest less (relative to their income) or not at all. The latter would occur if
an agent would borrow rather than save at the rate of return provided by the investment
technology.
Once a family has entered entrepreneurship, this will feed back into the further evolu-
tion of preferences within the dynasty. Here the interactions with leisure preferences
and patience are opposites of each other. In the case of patience, the fact that a dynasty
starts investing will increase the investment in patience, which amplifies the original
drive to invest. The reason is that investment endogenously steepens utility profiles
both within and across generations, i.e., utility drops during the early investment pe-
riod and increases in the later return periods. As we determined earlier, steep utility
profiles lead to increased investment in patience, which leads to even more investment.
Thus, if patience were the only endogenous aspect of preferences, we would expect to
observe further divergence in preferences across dynasties of entrepreneurs and others,
as well as accelerating wealth accumulation over time within entrepreneurial dynasties.
However, this effect will be mitigated or even reversed by the endogeneity of the taste
for leisure. The optimality conditions for labor supply and investing in leisure are un-
changed; thus, labor supply depends on leisure preference as well as the elasticity of
consumption with respect to labor effort, and investment in the taste for leisure depends
on future labor effort. Initially, an artisan or worker dynasty entering entrepreneurship
has little appreciation for leisure and is therefore hard working, as historically these
dynasties relied on labor income alone. However, the descendants of the initial en-
trepreneurs inherit the family firm. Thus, just as the landowners’, their consumption
derives increasingly from capital income and becomes less elastic with respect to labor
effort. As a consequence, the founders’ children and grandchildren work less hard than
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their forefathers and develop the same fine tastes for leisure that the land-owning class
already possesses. Of course, the drop in labor effort also lowers the return on invest-
ment, which can lead to a slowdown or even reversal in accumulation. Thus, the model
verifies the “Carnegie conjecture:” the initial success of a dynasty can lay the seed for
its ultimate downfall. Whether this effect dominates the increased accumulation of pa-
tience depends on parameters. This “Buddenbrooks” effect will be particularly strong if
investment in the taste for leisure is highly elastic and labor effort has a large effect on
entrepreneurial success, i.e., R−R is large.
We now provide a numerical illustration of the equilibrium dynamics of our model af-
ter the introduction of a capitalist technology. Table 1 summarizes the parameter val-
ues used for the simulation. The functional forms for investing in the taste for leisure
and patience are given by g(lA) = φAl
ξA
A and g(lB) = φBl
ξB
B . As described in Section 4,
the economy starts out under uniform preferences in the pre-industrial period long be-
fore the capitalist technology becomes available. Then people sort into professions, and
over time preferences approach occupation-specific steady states. In this pre-industrial
steady state, artisans earn a wage of 1.0 in the first and 2.0 in the second period, whereas
workers earn a wage of w ≈ 1.4 in each period.
Figure 3 displays the dynamics of capital and patience for members of the three occu-
pations. The economy is still in the pre-industrial steady state in period 0; in period 1,
the capitalist technology is introduced unexpectedly. Given the return of the investment
technology, the workers continue not to invest in patience. The artisans, however, are
sufficiently patient to find investment in capital attractive right away. Investment in cap-
ital increases the incentive for investing in patience, so that both the artisan’s patience
and their growth rate of capital increase for a few periods.
Figure 4 displays the dynamics of the taste for leisure during this transition. Once again,
for the workers nothing cganges. In contrast, as the artisan-turned-capitalist dynasties
grow richer, their work ethic deteriorates. After a few periods, their taste for leisure is
just as refined as that of the landowners. This contributes to a slow-down in their capital
accumulation.
Given that the workers do not invest, the landowners a fortiori do not do so either. They
have the same flat income profile (although possibly a higher income level) and the
same low patience as the workers, but additionally a higher appreciation for leisure.
They therefore continue to live off their land rents, and are soon overtaken by the rising
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class of capitalists as the economically dominant group in society.20
An interesting feature of the model is that the same pattern of catch-up and overtaking
can also be generated in an environment where the investment technology is available
from the outset, instead of being introduced later on. If all dynasties start out sufficiently
impatient, initially the investment technology is not used. Some dynasties, however,
sort into artisanship, and start to accumulate patience. After a few generations, the
patience of the artisans reaches a critical level, at which they start to use the investment
technology and turn into capitalists. In this version of the model, it is not the surprise
appearance of a new technology, but the endogenous accumulation of patience capital
that triggers the Industrial Revolution. Arguably, this sequence of events is closer in
spirit to Weber’s original hypothesis.
The outcome displayed in Figures 3 and 4 is extreme in that two classes are entirely
excluded from entrepreneurship and wealth inequality grows indefinitely. Other long-
run patterns are possible depending on the parameters of the production function. The
robust predictions of the theory is that the most patient and hard-working groups is the
first to make use of a new investment opportunity. Even if the environment were such
that ultimately even landowners invest, it is the middle class that gets a head start, and
possibly overtakes the landowning class in the process.
5 The Historical Context
In this section we document the basic historical facts underlying our theory, starting
with the social origin of the first industrialists. In a study of founders of large industrial
undertakings in Britain between 1750 and 1850, Crouzet (1985) concludes that “neither
the upper class nor the lower orders made a large contribution to the recruitment of in-
dustrialists” (p. 68). The only class that was significantly over-represented among the
industrialists was the middle class.21 Similarly, Jeremy (1990) documents that in a sam-
ple of founders of large British businesses, among those born before 1870, the majority
20In the model, all landowners are identical, so that there is not a single landowning investor. The sep-
aration of classes is less sharp if one adds preference shocks to the model. Then a few patient landowners
can emerge who decide to utilize the new accumulation opportunity. These landowners would become
quite rich, since they can earn income from both the industry and agriculture.
21In the sample analyzed in this study, only 2.3 percent of the industrialists came from peerage and
gentry (see Crouzet’s Table 5). In contrast, 85 percent of the new industrialists had a middle-class back-
ground. The professions represented in this class range from bankers and rich merchants at the upper
end to small artisans and tenant farmers at the lower end. As many as 27 percent of the men who entered
large-scale industry and 39 percent of the fathers of industrialists came from the lower ranks of the middle
class: “shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen and artisans, cultivators of various kind” (Crouzet 1985, p.
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had “left school in their mid-teens or earlier and then started to learn a trade, most fre-
quently by an apprenticeship” (p. 347). The minor involvement of landowners not only
in the establishment, but also in the financing of new enterprises is surprising, given the
extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of the landowning elite at the time. As late
as 1880, less than 5000 landowners still owned more than 50 percent of all land (Canna-
dine 1990, see also Lindert 1981, p. 378). Commenting on the underrepresentation of the
elite, Crouzet (1985) writes: “The contribution of that class to the industrial leadership
is not proportionate to its large share in the nation’s capital and income. Eric Richard
has rightly asked of the great landed families: ‘Why did they not do a great deal more
in the Industrial Revolution? After all, no class was better placed to benefit from the
transformation of the economy.’ ” (p. 70).
Even the already low estimate of the share of peers and gentry among the industrial-
ists overstates their true involvement in entrepreneurial activities. Landowners often
became involved simply by virtue of owning the land on which an industrial activ-
ity was to take place. In the majority of these cases, the aristocrats had no active en-
trepreneurial role. “If they owned blast-furnaces, forges and other establishments, they
tended to lease then to tenants rather than to operate them through salaried managers...
[They] were rather passive lessors and investors than active business leaders” (Rubin-
stein (1981) p.68). Some became involved in the textile industries, but even those “were
content to build—or help to build—mills and to lease them out” (Rubinstein (1981), p.
74). Similarly, those became involved in the construction of mines and railways on their
land usually insisted on receiving regular periodical payments over the sums invested,
without any commitment to financing the growth of the enterprises. From the 1880, an
increasing numbers of aristocrats became board members of public companies. How-
ever, this step was taken only by the poorer members of the upper class. “Apart from
Rothschild and Glenconner, all landowners who were company directors were indeed
impoverished” (Cannadine (1990), p. 406-409).
The new class of industrialists progressively replaced the landed elite as the economi-
cally dominant group in society, as reflected, with some lag, in the wealth distribution.
127). The contribution of the working class (about 70 percent of the population) was moderate; no more
than 12 percent of the industrialists came from this class. Part of the explanation for the small number of
upper-class entrepreneurs is, of course, that there were few aristocrats to begin with. But the differences
in numbers do not explain the extent of the under-representation of the upper classes. At the beginning of
the nineteenth century, peerage and gentry accounted for about 1.4 percent of the population, while the
middle class made up slightly less than 30 percent. Thus, a much larger share of the middle class than of
the peerage and gentry ended up as entrepreneurs.
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In the first half of the nineteenth century, large fortunes were still by and large asso-
ciated with land ownership. Rubinstein (1981) reports that among the 189 individuals
who died between 1809 and 1858 with a fortune exceeding one million pounds, 95 per-
cent were wealthy landowners. However, merchants and industrial capitalists were
already catching up. Lindert (1986, Table 1) documents that in 1810 the average estate
of living gentlemen was more than three times larger than that of merchants and indus-
trial capitalists, whereas in 1875 it was 16 percent smaller. Soon thereafter, landowners
no longer featured prominently among the wealthiest families in the country. Between
1900 and 1939, only 7 percent of the 273 individuals who died as millionaires belonged
to the landed elite (Rubinstein 1981, Tables 3.2 to 3.4.). Among the non-landed million-
aires, about half of the new fortunes were generated in the manufacturing sector, with
most of the rest accounted for by commerce and finance. The old elite managed to pre-
serve a significant social and economic influence, partly through intermarriage with the
new industrial dynasties.22 Yet, the monopoly of political and economic power that this
small elite had enjoyed for centuries was never to be restored.
Our theory attributes this transformation to class-specific preferences which, in turn,
were shaped by the economic conditions in the pre-industrial period. Artisans and
craftsmen, the typical professions of the pre-industrial middle class, were required to
make large human capital investments, and consequently had steep lifetime income
profiles. In most of Europe, an artisan’s career advanced through three stages: appren-
ticeship, journeymanship, and mastership.23 Apprenticeship would on average take 5–6
years, but in some professions one would remain an apprentice for up to 12 years (Ep-
stein 1991). After apprenticeship, artisans would become journeymen and travel around
European cities, serving as employees at some master’s shop. This wandering period
would last for a minimum of 3–4 years (Friedrichs 1995). Savings and frugality were
essential for journeymen who hoped to become a master one day. “Unless he was able
to count on substantial inheritance or fortunate marriage, a journeyman’s primary in-
terest was to amass capital for opening their shop or business” (Epstein 1991, p. 115).
22Clark (2007, ch. 15) documents the story of the Sassoon family, whose founding member, David
Sassoon, was a Sephardic Jew merchant born in Baghdad in 1792. By the 1880s the family constituted
several global enterprises, investing in India and China and by the 1920s it owned more than one tenth of
the Bombay cotton industry. Several members of the family moved to England and were absorbed into
the English aristocracy through marriages. See also Cannadine (1990), p. 347.
23The life of an apprentice was not glamorous. “Upon payment of a placement fee, apprentices took
their place in their master’s household, agreeing to obey and respect him as a father. . . . Not all ap-
prentices reached mastership, but this does not gainsay the fact that the purpose of apprenticeship was
selection and the goal a direct route to mastership” (Farr 2000, p. 33).
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Having completed his time on the road, the journeyman could apply for admission to
mastership, which was in itself an expensive process.24 Only at that point, if successful,
could the journeyman become a master and a new guild member, and open a shop at
his own expense.
In contrast, the age-earnings profiles of agricultural workers and landowners were rel-
atively flat. Burnette (2002) documents that the wages of English farm workers in the
early nineteenth century varied little between the ages of 20 and 60. The landed gen-
try derived its income mostly from owning land and, to a smaller extent, from min-
ing projects (Beckett 1986). Annual variation in a landowners’ income stems from two
dominant sources: fluctuation in land rental rates, and changes in the size of the estate
through land sales or purchases. While there were always some economically successful
families who were able to increase the size of their holdings, most aristocratic landown-
ers merely aspired to preserve the estate, so as to ultimately pass to the next generation
just as much as they once inherited. In periods of rising land rental rates, the income of
landowners as a class would increase as well; but given that, with few exceptions, rents
tended to change only slowly over time (at least until 1800), these movements would not
generate the steep lifetime income profiles that were typical for artisans and craftsmen.25
In our theory, differences in economic conditions ultimately manifest themselves in
class-specific preferences. And indeed, the stark contrast of the new entrepreneurs’ thrift
and work ethic with the landed aristocracy’s free-spending habits and leisurely lifestyle
has long been part of the conventional wisdom on the Industrial Revolution. The leisure
orientation of the pre-industrial upper class was one of its defining characteristics: in-
deed, the term “gentleman” traditionally signified a man who did not need to work.
24The applicants owed the payment of a series of fees, the completion of a masterpiece according to
the guild regulations, and the outlay (if the masterpiece was accepted) for a luxurious banquet for the
masters he hoped to join. In addition, he had to submit the name of a proposed bride, whom the guild
was supposed to examine and approve. See Phelps Brown and Hopkins 1957, Munro 2004 and Farr 2000
for additional evidence.
25Real rents per acre in England were roughly constant between 1300 and 1600. In the early seventeenth
century, real rents increased sharply, and then leveled off again until 1800 (see Clark 2007, Figure 14.2).
In principle, a flat profile for overall family income need not imply that individual consumption profiles
were flat as well. In particular, one might imagine that aristocrats started to consume heavily only after
inheriting their estates, while living frugally during their younger years. However, the available evidence
suggests that, if anything, the opposite was true. Young aristocrats typically did not work during their
childhood and young adulthood and were supported by their parents. These family support payments
tended to be large, and contributed to aristocratic indebtedness: “family payments were not the only
cause of aristocratic indebtedness, but contemporaries usually regard them as playing a crucial role”
(Beckett 1986, p. 298). Thus, aristocrats usually lived in some comfort during their entire lives and did not
experience the stark contrast of a sober adolescence with relative prosperity during adulthood that was
typical for urban artisans and craftsmen.
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“Wealth and leisure allowed the aristocracy to develop a distinctive class culture that
was reflected in the clothes they wore, the food they ate, their manners . . . and above
all in their recreations.” (Mate 2006, p.279). Consistent with our theory, the aristocratic
devotion to leisure grew more sophisticated over time. The social “London Season” had
its origin in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and expanded to involving as
many as 4000 families in the late nineteenth century (see Cunningham 1990, p. 291). The
countryside also saw an expanding range of leisure activities. Shooting, fox-hunting,
and cricket all became fashionable upper-class sports in the eighteenth century, while
yachting grew popular in the nineteenth century (see Cunningham 1990, p. 292 and
Beckett 1986, p.346). The available data show that the differences in work and leisure
time between upper and lower classes were quantitatively large. Voth (2000) documents
that in a sample of Londoners in 1760 and 1800 the involvement of the elite in leisure
activities was three to five times as large as that of other social groups, whereas there
were no significant differences between the lower and the middle classes (Tables 3.23
and 3.24, p. 112–13).
In contrast, the middle class developed over time a strict work ethic and a growing dis-
dain for leisure (Applebaum 1992). As pointed out by Weber, one source of this change
was the protestant reformation. Unlike in the medieval Catholicism, the glorification
of God no longer required a contemplative attitude or a praise of poverty. Rather, eco-
nomic success and an austere life became a way of glorifying God. “The summum
bonum of this ethics (is) the earning of more money, combined with the strict avoidance
of all spontaneous enjoyment of life” (Weber 1905, p. 8). Protestant values were also
closely connected to the second element of our theory of preference formation, namely,
patience or thrift.26 Max Weber describes the effects of Puritan values on capital accu-
mulation as follows: “When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release
of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumulation of capi-
tal through ascetic compulsion to save” (p.172). Religious fervor was not, however, the
only source of changing attitudes. According to Perkin (1969), after the Restoration of
1660 secular values such as social status and prestige also became increasingly tied to
wealth accumulation and economic success.
26Work ethic and patience are important not only for investments but also for innovation, as witnessed
by the famous Edison’s statement that invention is one percent of inspiration and ninety-nine percent of
perspiration. Mokyr (1990, p.241) argues that pre-industrial Britain benefitted from the arrival of skilled
workers fleeing anti-Protestant prosecution in France. Our theory suggests that this exodus may have fos-
tered both the entrepreneurial spirit and the innovative capability that became later key for the industrial
revolution in Britain.
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The first industrialists were especially imbued with this new ethic of patience and hard
work. “Almost all major entrepreneurial figures took enormous risks, worked long and
hard hours, and rarely enjoyed the fruits of their efforts until late in life . . . ” (Mokyr
1999, p. 41). Parsimony was particularly important because a large share of the new en-
terprises relied on personal savings and retained earnings to grow. “The early industri-
alists . . . lived very modestly, spent only a fraction of their earnings for their households
and put the rest back into the business” (von Mises 1963, p. 622).
To some extent, the reliance on retained earnings was feasible because, in most sectors,
capital needs were relatively low during the first Industrial Revolution (see Mokyr 1999,
p. 96). However, the shortfall of savings of the wealthy upper class has also been sin-
gled out as a contributing factor. For instance, Davis and Gallman (2001) write: “It
may well have been true, as Postan noted, that at least two fifteenth-century families
could have provided all the finance required to fund the entire Industrial Revolution.
However, those (and other elite) families chose not to redirect their existing portfolios
to meet either the relatively small demands of the manufacturing sector—demands that
were met largely out of retained earnings—or much more importantly, the demands for
supporting investment in infrastructure, particularly canal construction” (p. 50).
The lack of industrial investment is only one indication of the low patience of the upper
class. If the members of the upper class were truly lacking in patience, they should have
been unwilling to invest in other kinds of financial assets as well. The historical evidence
supports this implication. Well before the Industrial Revolution, the British government
became a major borrower, with multiple bond issues (mostly for war finance) through-
out the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These bonds were mostly purchased by
the urban middle classes, whereas the contribution of the landed classes was insignifi-
cant (Dickson 1967, p. 302). The financing of early public companies follows the same
pattern. Bowen (1989) documents that most stockholders of the East India Company be-
tween 1756 and 1791 were “clergymen, bankers, military and naval personnel, officials,
brokers, merchants large and small, and retailers,” whereas “beyond doubt there was no
large-scale investment in the Company by the landed interest or aristocracy” (p. 195).
The pre-industrial elite thus played a surprisingly minor role in financing government
borrowing and private enterprise well before the Industrial Revolution, despite being
far wealthier than the middle class. This stands in marked contrast to the wealth elites in
modern industrial countries, who generally own disproportionate shares of most types
of assets, including government debt and public stock (see Carroll 2001 for evidence on
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the United States).27
Rather than investing the rents derived from their estates, many landowners used their
land as collateral to borrow money. The scale of this borrowing substantially increased
when long-term mortgage loans where introduced after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Beckett (1986) reports that by the mid-eighteenth century “many families already had an
accumulation [of debt] several generations old” (p. 300).28 Rather than being taken on to
improve existing estates or to buy more land, most of this debt resulted from a failure to
match expenditure to income:29 “Rents and royalties were apparently being sucked into
conspicuous consumption and frittered away in spiraling marriage contracts; and the
gap between getting and spending was filled not by offloading assets such as land, but
by borrowing from—in effect—the commercial, industrial and shopkeeping members
of the populace” (Beckett 1986, p. 316. See also Devine 1971, Kindleberger 1993 (p.175)
and Porter 1982). Aristocratic indebtedness grew severely during the nineteenth cen-
tury, and a 1847 writer claimed that “between half and two-thirds of English land was
encumbered (i.e. mortgaged)” (Beckett 1986, p. 315). Cannadine (1994) summarizes the
situation as follows: “Whatever might have been the financial state of individual fam-
ilies, it seems clear that the landed aristocracy as a class was in debt through the first
three-quarters of the nineteenth century” (p. 49).
Given our hypothesis of a low propensity to invest among the upper classes, one might
wonder why the aristocracy did not simply sell land to middle-class buyers. One reason
is that the land market in Britain was subject to pervasive legal restrictions that made
selling land costly or even impossible. Most large estates were entailed, meaning that
they could neither be split nor sold by the owner.30 Mortgaging their land to merchants
and banks was therefore the only way in which, de facto, many landowners could run
down their assets. Eventually, after statutory reforms and changes in the common law
27Notice that our theory does not posit that landowners were always impatient; in fact, the first aristo-
crats in a dynasty, who initially acquired title and estate, may have plausibly been particularly patient.
28See also Temin and Voth (2004).
29Thompson (1994) documents that ever since 1700, the landowners progressively withdrew from day-
to-day involvement in the management of their estates. The investments and technical innovations in
agriculture during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which played an important role in the
British Industrial Revolution, were carried out almost entirely by tenant farmers. According to Canna-
dine (1994), most debt was taken on with the objective of “the enhancement of the social prestige and the
fulfillment of the traditional responsibilities of the landowner. . . . To the extent that such self-indulgent
activities were financed from middle- and working-class savings, . . . this definitely amounted to a ‘haem-
orrhage of capital,’ a ‘misallocation of resources,’ as funds from urban and industrial Britain were diverted
to underpin the indulgence of the landed order” (p. 48–49).
30Through the institution of entail, an aristocratic landowner could prevent his descendants from selling
part or all of the estate.
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eased the restrictions on land sales, many families overburdened by debt did sell off
parts or all of their estates. By that time, the economic problems of the upper classes—
aggravated by falling land rents after 1878—had become so pressing that land sales
reached a massive scope. Cannadine (1990) summarizes the dismantling of aristocratic
landownership during the first part of the twentieth century as follows: “The scale of
this territorial transfer was rivaled only by two other landed revolutions in Britain this
Millennium: The Norman Conquest and the Dissolution of the Monasteries” (p. 89).
While other factors (taxation, decline of land rents) contributed to this final outcome, a
clear thread links the chronic indebtedness of the landed aristocracy over centuries with
its eventual decline and inability to hold on to the land.
Our theory predicts that the economic changes triggered by the Industrial Revolution
should feed back on preferences. Among the thriving bourgeoisie, we should observe an
increasing appreciation of leisure and ultimately a decline in economic success. Indeed,
social historians (see, e.g., Cunningham (1980)) document an explosion in the demand
for leisure by the bourgeois middle class in the second half of the nineteenth century,
reflecting, according to Bailey (1989), a waning of the austere values of the early days
of industrialization: “At mid-century the Victorian middle class had been suspicious
of the moral temptations of a beckoning leisure world, but had rapidly learned to as-
similate it to their culture . . . By the end of the century prescriptions had become more
permissive—from ‘Be virtuous and you will be happy’ to ‘Be happy and you will be
virtuous’—and middle class leisure grew more expansive and assured” (p.110). The
changing preferences also affected other spheres of private and social life. To some ex-
tent, the appetite for consumption and leisure crowded out religion, in line with We-
ber’s secularization hypothesis. Religious fervor, earlier a defining trait of the urban
middle class, started fading in the second half of the century. Activities competing
with leisure such as daily family prayers declined: “Remaining in the proper frame
in mind. . . when the smell of bacon and coffee assailed one’s nose. . . was too much for
most of the younger generation and slowly the custom was shifted to once a week on
Sunday evenings, and, as leisure activities for all age groups grew more varied, was fi-
nally abandoned.” (Davidoff 1973, p.35).31 The new material experience of the middle
31Obelkevich (1990) summarizes the changing attitude of the middle class towards religious values
in the following terms: ”It was in the middle classes that the Victorian religious boom had the biggest
impact . . . In the 1870s the first signs appeared that the long period of growth was coming to an end.
Though membership was still increasing, it failed to keep pace with the growth in the population, and
church going actually began to decline: in middle-class districts in London attendance fell by more than
a third between 1886 and 1902. Such hallmarks of Victorian religiosity as strict Sunday observance and
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class had ceased to be congruent with the rigid Puritan doctrine.
The change of values also affected the “industrial spirit,” which according to Wiener
(1981) started to decline after reaching its high-water mark with the Great Exhibition of
1951. At that time, many of the industrial dynasties underwent a process of gentrifica-
tion and absorbed some of the values of the landed elite. “Sometimes successful indus-
trialists left business altogether; other times they stayed in business, but viewed it ever
more as a social duty rather than an economic opportunity” (p. 147). Florence (1953)
argues that for the hereditary manager “the pecuniary incentive to large-scale expan-
sion . . . may be weak, since the family are [sic] already well-established. The transpecu-
niary objects are often stability and a conventional standard of life with plenty of leisure
and long weekends devoted to sports and other gentlemanly pursuits rather than mak-
ing one’s way farther up the ladder” (p. 303, cited in Wiener 1981) Consistent with
these changing preferences, we observe a waning of entrepreneurial success among en-
trepreneurial dynasties as family firms are passed on from the founding fathers to sub-
sequent generations (the “Buddenbrooks effect”). In an empirical study of 1149 British
business leaders born between 1789 and 1937, Nicholas (1999b) documents that “there is
a comparatively low lifetime rate of wealth accumulation for firm inheritors. The older
the dynasty, the lower is the rate of return. Third-generation entrepreneurs clearly un-
derperformed relative to firm founders or managers”(p. 706–7). This observation is at
odds with a purely genetic view of entrepreneurial skills and preference transmission.32
6 Discussion of Alternative Hypotheses
The mechanism outlined in this paper is not the only possible explanation of the chang-
ing fortunes of different social classes throughout the Industrial Revolution. A first al-
ternative hypothesis is that the relative decline of the aristocracy was driven by changes
family prayers were being abandoned . . . Behind the statistics of falling attendances lay a deeper disaffec-
tion from the churches and their messages.” (p. 338-346) The same author documents how the different
churches responded by softening their message and precepts.
32This is echoed by Alfred Marshall (1890) who writes: “It would . . . at first sight seem likely that
business men should constitute a sort of caste; . . . But the actual state of things is very different. . . . [W]hen
a man has got together a great business, his descendants often fail, in spite of their great advantage, to
develop the high abilities and special turn of mind and temperament required for carrying it on with equal
success. . . . When a full generation has passed . . . then the business almost invariably falls to pieces. . . . ”
(pp. 299-300). A related argument is the “Carnegie conjecture,” i.e., Andrew Carnegie’s (1891) assertion
that wealth “deadens the talents and energies” of children. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993)
provide evidence from the PSID that inherited wealth depresses labor supply. This is consistent with our
model.
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in the value of land rather than the failure to embrace industrialization. Indeed, the cri-
sis that started in the late nineteenth century coincided with a period of rapidly falling
land rents. However, viewed over the entire industrialization period, rents increased
substantially—arguably an effect of the growth in industrial production—and the de-
cline that occurred after 1878 only partially offset the earlier run up.33 On the whole it
appears as if the evolution of rents over time may have delayed the economic decline of
the landowning class. More generally, the robust prediction of our theory is a relative,
but not necessarily absolute economic decline. Consistent with this prediction, even
during the period of rapidly rising rents the wealth growth of the aristocracy did not
keep pace with that of new industrialists (as noted in the previous section).
Another hypothesis is that the upper classes were excluded from industrialization be-
cause urban workers possessed skills that were essential for industrial activities, while
the landowners did not. For certain sectors and activities, there is indeed strong evi-
dence showing that prior experience was important in determining who would become
an entrepreneur.34 However, the evidence also suggests that differences in skills cannot
be the only or main explanation. A significant share of the new industrialists had not
previously been involved in any form of manufacturing. For instance, as many as 22
percent of the industrialists’ fathers were yeomen and farmers, groups with no expe-
rience in industrial activity (Crouzet 1985). Moreover, there is evidence of substantial
mobility across industrial sectors. Crouzet reports that no more than 40 percent of the
fathers of the industrialists in his sample worked either in the same industry or in an
industry or trade with forward or backward linkages with the branch in which they
set up (Table 8, p.152). Landowners were therefore not at a particular disadvantage in
terms of their skills relative to many of the middle-class entrepreneurs. In fact, a number
of key sectors during industrialization (such as mining, railways, and canals) required
land as a major input. In these sectors, if anything, the landowners should have had an
advantage over middle-class city dwellers.
33According to Turner, Beckett, and Afton (1997), rents per acre tripled between 1790 and 1878 and fell
by 27 percent between 1878 and 1910 (Table A2.1). Within the period, there were sharp increases between
1790-1815 (+124 percent) and 1850-1878 (+37 percent) and a period of flat rents in between. Clark (2007),
who focuses on real rents per acre for farmland, reports a less pronounced increase and a sharper fall after
1878 (Figure 14.2). Nevertheless, the overall pattern is the same. One important factor that is associated
with the evolution of land rents is the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815 and their ultimate repeal in
1846. The effect of the Corn Laws on rents is controversial, though. For instance, Moore (1965) argues that
they were not particularly effective in sustaining high agricultural prices. After the repeal of the Corn
Laws, grain imports gradually increased, but rents actually increased over the following thirty years.
34Skills and experience in related activities were particularly important in the textile industry (see
Crouzet 1985, ch. 8, pp. 116-125, and also footnote 79, p.206).
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A related argument is that the landowners, busy managing their rural estates, may have
lacked the time and opportunity to enter industrial activities, which mostly took place in
or near cities. However, many landowners did not actively manage their estates. Even
more telling, it was not only the heirs of estates who shunned business activity; second
and third sons of landowners did so as well. These younger sons had no choice but to
enter some activity other than landowning, and were therefore not held back by their
obligations to an existing estate. Nevertheless, they did not enter business in any larger
numbers than their landowning fathers. For instance, consider Table 2, which reports
the occupational choices of Cambridge graduates during the period 1750–1899. The
vast majority of students at Cambridge during this period were sons of the landowning
class, so their occupational choices (other than landowning) give us some idea of which
professions younger sons entered.35 Strikingly, until 1850, not a single graduate got
involved in banking or business (widely defined as any “profit-oriented activity”), and
even after 1850 the percentage remains surprisingly low. This evidence is corroborated
by the study of Crouzet (1985), who documents that few of the new industrialists’ fathers
were landowners (see footnote 21).
The arguments discussed so far do not rely on group-specific preferences. We now turn
to explanations that do involve heterogeneity in preferences, but of a different nature
than in our model. The most prominent of these theories, which is advocated by histori-
ans of the Victorian period such as Cain and Hopkins (1993), is that a social norm against
the involvement in entrepreneurial activities excluded the British aristocracy from in-
dustrial capitalism: “A gentleman required income, and preferably sizeable wealth, but
was not to be sullied by the acquisitive process” (p. 23). To the extent to which this
exclusion was a matter of personal preference and (possibly acquired) taste, this the-
sis coincides with our explanation. However, as the classical theory of Veblen (1899)
suggests, social norms may have also served as an instrument of social exclusion. A
gentleman violating the norm would lose the recognition of his peers, with potentially
grave consequences for social standing and access to aristocratic privileges. In this case,
the enforcement would be partly extrinsic: even a gentleman enjoying hard work in
principle may prefer to shun work in practice to avoid social sanctions.
It is difficult to empirically distinguish the individual-preference and social-norm ap-
proaches to class-specific preferences, because the implications for individual behavior
are similar. One indication for the importance of individual preferences is that the “gen-
35One group missing here is those choosing the military career, who would attend a military academy
instead of Oxford or Cambridge.
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tlemanly values” of the upper class persisted even after the aristocracy lost its predom-
inance. If social norms had no function other than serving as an instrument of social
exclusion, we would expect these norms to disappear once aristocratic privileges lost
their value. The historical evidence suggests that aristocratic norms not only persisted,
but even spread to other social classes throughout the nineteenth century.36 This obser-
vation is inconsistent with an explanation for class-specific preferences based on social
exclusion alone, because members of lower classes could not have gained access to so-
cial and economic privileges by merely imitating the tastes of the upper class.37
Perkin (1969) and Mokyr (1999) take the argument one step further and argue that ac-
quiring gentlemanly status was an end to itself. In this view, both the initial accumu-
lation of wealth and the later increase in leisure and ostentatious consumption can be
interpreted as means to the end of first acquiring and later displaying social status. As
in our interpretation, the economic slowdown of the industrial dynasties is a conscious
choice, albeit for a different reason. While in our theory the increase in leisure is driven
by a change in preferences, in Perkin and Mokyr it is part of the aristocratic ideal to
which they had always aspired.
From a theoretical perspective, we regard the social-norm explanation as complemen-
tary to our theory, because they mutually reinforce each other. If we introduced a so-
cial norm in our model that imposed social or economic sanctions on hard-working
landowners, a landowning dynasty’s incentives for investing in the taste for leisure
would increase even further; thus, the imposition of a social norm would generate indi-
vidual preferences in accordance with the norm. Likewise, when the social norms first
arose, the aristocracy may have chosen to emphasize leisure and refined tastes as an in-
strument of social exclusion precisely because their income process granted them abun-
dant free time, whereas members of other classes had no choice but to work. As Veblen
put it, “abstention from labour is the conventional evidence of wealth and is therefore
the conventional mark of social standing; and this insistence on the meritoriousness of
36When Britain went into economic decline relative to competitors such as Germany and the United
States after 1870, much of the blame was placed on the British education system (in particular the public
schools and Oxbridge) for spreading aristocratic anti-business and anti-industrial attitudes to the upper
middle classes; see the extensive discussion in Rubinstein (1993).
37Whereas the industrial elite ultimately started to appreciate leisure, for the most part it did not ac-
quire the main prerequisites of aristocratic privilege, i.e., land and titles. For instance, Nicholas (1999a)
notes that “those who made fortunes in business . . . did not purchase or inherit land on large scale. This
was despite the fact that their wealth gave them an unprecedented opportunity for land acquisition.”
Indeed, many preferred renting land for their leisure’s sake, but did not bother with buying it. This sug-
gests that leisure had intrinsic appeal to them, rather than being enjoyed solely for the purpose of social
advancement (see also Rubinstein 1981, 1996).
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wealth leads to a more strenuous insistence on leisure” (p. 26). Thus, the social norm
may have its roots in the same economic conditions that generate class-specific prefer-
ences in our theory.
A last possibility is that aspects of preferences other than patience and leisure apprecia-
tion were driving the economic decisions of different social classes during the Industrial
Revolution. For example, risk aversion or attitudes towards innovation may have also
been relevant for the emergence of a spirit of capitalism, although these traits would ap-
ply mainly to entrepreneurship narrowly conceived rather than to the general attitude
towards investments. Extending the analysis to these additional aspects of preferences
may provide further insights. For instance, similar to the case of patience, financial de-
velopment would tend to equalize the attitudes towards risk across dynasties engaged
in different professions. However, it may induce parents to encourage risk-taking be-
havior in their children, contrary to the analysis of patience in this paper, where financial
development reduces the incentive to invest in patience.
7 Conclusions
The modern theory of economic growth focuses on changes in material conditions and
standards of living, while ignoring, with few exceptions, the role of culture. This ap-
proach is legitimate as long as culture, while possibly being shaped by economic con-
ditions, does not feed back into economic decisions. Recently, however, a number of
economists have uncovered growing evidence that preferences, culture, and religion are
important determinants of economic decisions and outcomes.
In this paper, we have developed a theory where economic conditions and culture are
mutually interlinked. The theory shows that stratification of preferences across occupa-
tions may occur even in an initially homogeneous society. In reality, historical accidents
may have fostered the stratification process. For instance, the political and religious
forces behind the success of the protestant reformation may have contributed to the
formation and transmission of preferences conducive to hard work and wealth accu-
mulation. Likewise, demographic changes such as increasing longevity may have also
played a role. A longer life horizon would tend to increase an agent’s propensity to
accumulate human capital and material wealth, reinforcing the effects of technological
shocks at the time of the Industrial Revolution.
Although the analysis targets a specific historical episode, we expect the theory devel-
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oped in this paper to be applicable to other open questions in macroeconomics and
economic growth. For instance, a recent macroeconomic literature argues that hetero-
geneity in discount factors is key for explaining portfolio choices and the dynamics of
the wealth distribution in modern economies.38 Our theory provides a new mechanism
for the emergence and transmission of heterogeneous preferences. The theory also offers
a new perspective on the impact of financial development on economic development.
These and other aspects of endogenous preference formation are left to future research.
A Mathematical Appendix
Sequential Formulation of the Decision Problem: The sequential decision problem correspond-
ing to (4) is given by:
V ?(A0, B0) = max
{ ∞∑
t=0
zt
[
(1−Bt) log(w1,i t n1 t) +At (1− n1 t)
+Bt log(w2,i t n2 t) +At (1− n1 t)− lAt − lB t
]}
(15)
subject to it ∈ I n1 t ∈ [0, 1] n2 t ∈ [0, 1] lA t ∈ [0, l¯At] lB t ∈ [0, l¯B] At+1 = ψA¯+ (1− ψ)At + g(lAt)
and Bt+1 = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bt + f(lB t).
Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of an Equilibrium with Constant Wages:
Proposition 6 Assume f to be of the form f (lB) = ξlB , where ξ satisfies:
1− z(1− ψ)
z
≤ ξ log(γ) ≤ 1− z (1− ψ)
z
1
z (1− ψ) . (16)
Suppose that the economy starts out with everyone having the natural patience B0 = B¯ and the steady-
state taste for leisure A. Then for sufficiently large q > 0 there exists an equilibrium such that for all t ≥ 2
the proportion of workers and artisans in the population is constant, and the agricultural wage is given
by:
logwF = log
(
αµα−1
)
= log(q) + B¯ log(γ)− l¯B
z
+
ξl¯B log(γ)
1− z (1− ψ) . (17)
The equilibrium is characterized by occupational segregation, i.e., from t ≥ 2 onwards, parents and chil-
dren in the same dynasty choose the same profession. The taste for leisure remains constant in all dynas-
ties. Worker dynasties do not invest in patience (lB = 0), whereas artisan dynasties invest the maximum
amount (lB = l¯B). The distribution of patience converges to a steady state where the patience of all
workers remains at the natural level B¯, whereas the patience of all artisans converges to the maximum
BM = B¯ + ξl¯B/ψ.
38See Krusell and Smith, Jr. (1998), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Samwick (1998), Browning, Hansen,
and Heckman (1999), Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003), and De Nardi (2004).
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Condition (16) guarantees that all members of the investing dynasties choose artisanship for
t ≥ 2, whereas all others prefer to be workers. Under this assumption, the occupational transition
occurs in one generation. It is possible to characterize equilibria involving longer transitions
under weaker parameter restrictions, but this is omitted for simplicity.
Under a concave production function for patience f(lB), there is a motive for smoothing invest-
ment over multiple periods, which can lead to more complicated transitions. However, the basic
forces leading to preference stratification are the same. In Section 4.2 we numerically solve a
model with a concave production function for patience.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is an application of Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.2 in Stokey and
Lucas (1989). The Bellman equation (6) defines a mapping T on the space of bounded continuous
functions on the interval [B¯, Bmax], endowed with the sup norm, where the mapping is given by:
TvB(B) = sup
i∈I,0≤lB≤l¯B
{
(1−B) log(w1,i) +B log(w2,i)− lB + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f(lB))
}
.
(18)
Since we assume 0 < z < 1, Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction are met, and hence
T has a unique fixed point by the Contraction Mapping Theorem. Using Corollary 1, we can now
establish that the value function (i.e., the fixed point of the mapping T ) is non-decreasing and
weakly convex by establishing that the operator T preserves these properties.
To establish that the value function is non-decreasing, let vB be a non-decreasing bounded con-
tinuous function. We need to show that TvB is non-decreasing as well. Choose two points
Bh > Bl from the interval [B¯, Bmax],. We want to establish that TvB(Bh) ≥ TvB(Bl). Since
the right-hand side of (18) is the maximization of a continuous function over a compact set, the
maximum is attained. Let l and {w1, w2} be choices attaining the maximum for Bl. We then
have:
TvB(Bh) ≥ (1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l))
≥ (1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l)) = TvB(Bl),
which is the desired result. Here the first inequality follows because the choices l, {w1, w2} may
not be maximizing at Bh, and the second inequality follows because vB is assumed to be in-
creasing, and we have that (1−Bh) log(w1) + Bh log(w2) ≥ (1−Bl) log(w1) + Bl log(w2) since
w2 ≥ w1.
To establish that the value function is convex, let vB be a (weakly) convex bounded continuous
function. We need to establish that TvB is also a convex function. To show this, choose a number
θ such that 0 < θ < 1, let Bh > Bl, and let B = θBh + (1 − θ)Bl. We now need to show that
θTvB(Bh) + (1− θ)TvB(Bl) ≥ TvB(B). Let l and {w1w2} be choices attaining the maximum for
B. Since these are feasible, but not necessarily optimal choices at Bh and Bl, we have:
TvB(Bh) ≥ (1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l)),
T vB(Bl) ≥ (1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l)).
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Using these results, we have:
θ TvB(Bh) + (1− θ)TvB(Bl)
≥ θ [(1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l))]
+ (1− θ) [(1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l))]
= (1−B) log(w1) +B log(w2)− l
+ z
[
θvB((1− ψ)Bh + f(l)) + (1− θ)vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l))
]
≥ (1−B) log(w1) +B log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f(l)) = TvB(B),
which is the desired condition. Here, the last inequality follows from the assumed convexity of
vB . The operator T therefore preserves convexity, and thus the fixed point must also be convex.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1, Part II: Choose two patience levels Bh > Bl, and let the corresponding
optimal choices be l, w1, w2 and l, w1, w2. We want to prove that l ≥ l and w2/w1 ≥ w2/w1. We
proceed in two steps. (a) We show, by deriving a contradiction, that we cannot have simultane-
ously w2/w1 < w2/w1 and l < l. (b) We show that the solution must feature either (i) l ≥ l and
w2/w1 ≥ w2/w1 or (ii) l < l and w2/w1 < w2/w1. Hence, (a) and (b) establish the desired result.
(a): Since the choices are optimal given Bl and Bh, the following inequalities must be satisfied:
(1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l¯ + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l))
≥ (1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l)), (19)
(1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l¯ + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l))
≤ (1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l + z vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l)), (20)
where the first inequality follows from optimization at Bh and the second from optimization at
Bl. Subtracting (20) from (19) on both sides, we obtain the following condition:
(Bh −Bl)
[
log
(
w2
w1
)
− log
(
w2
w1
)]
≥ Φ (Bh, Bl, l¯, l) (21)
where:
Φ
(
Bh, Bl, l¯, l
) ≡ z [vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l))− vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l))]
− z [vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bh + f(l¯))− vB(ψB¯ + (1− ψ)Bl + f(l¯))] .
Due to the convexity of vB and the fact that f is increasing, Φ
(
Bh, Bl, l¯, l
) ≥ 0 if l ≤ l, and
Φ
(
Bh, Bl, l¯, l
) ≤ 0 if l ≥ l. The sign of the left-hand side is equal to the sign of w2/w1 − w2/w1.
Suppose, now, to derive a contradiction, that w2/w1 < w2/w1 and l < l. Then, the left hand-side
of (21) would be negative and the right-hand side of (21) would be non-negative, violating the
inequality. Thus, it is impossible that both w2/w1 < w2/w1 and l < l.
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(b): Optimization in the choice of the income profile implies the following inequalities:
(1−Bh) log(w1) +Bh log(w2)− l¯ ≥ (1−Bl) log(y1) +Bh log(y2)− l¯, (22)
(1−Bl) log(w1) +Bl log(w2)− l ≤ (1−Bl) log(y1) +Bh log(y2)− l.
Subtracting the two equations as before, we get:
(Bh −Bl)
[
log
(
w2
w1
)
− log
(
y
2
y
1
)]
≥ l − l, (23)
which implies that either (i) l ≥ l and w2/w1 ≥ w2/w1 or (ii) l < l and w2/w1 < w2/w1. However,
the possibility that l < l and w2/w1 < w2/w1 has already been ruled out in (a). Therefore, we
must conclude that l ≥ l and w2/w1 ≥ w2/w1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1, Part 3: In Proposition 1, we established that the steepness of the optimal
income profile w2/w1 is increasing in B, and that the optimal choice of investment in patience
lB(B) is also increasing in B. It then follows that the patience as well as the steepness of the
income profiles of all future members of a dynasty (child, grandchild etc.) are increasing in the
patience of the current member of a dynasty.
Since there are only finitely many occupations, we can subdivide the state space [0, Bmax] into
finitely many closed intervals (they are closed because of our continuity assumptions in As-
sumption 1), where each interval corresponds to the choice of a given occupation i. The agent
is just indifferent between two occupations at the boundary of two such intervals, and strictly
prefers a given occupation in the interior of such an interval. The intervals can be further subdi-
vided according to the occupational choice of the child. Since lB(B) may not be singled valued,
there may be multiple optimal B′ corresponding to a given B today. Nevertheless, since the B′
are strictly increasing in B (because of Proposition 1 and ψ < 1) and given that there are only
finitely many occupations, we can once again subdivide today’s state space in finitely many close
intervals, each one corresponding to a specific occupational choice of the child, such that the in-
tervals overlap only at their boundary points. Continuing this way, the state space [B¯, Bmax]
can be divided into a countable number of closed intervals (there is a finite number of possible
occupations in each of the countably many future generations), where each interval corresponds
to a specific occupational choice of each generation. Let [Bk, Bk+1] be such an interval. We want
to establish that the value function is linear over this interval, and that the optimal choice of
patience l(B) is single-valued and constant over the interior of this interval.
It is useful to consider the sequential formulation (15) of the decision problem. Taking the present
and future occupational choices it as given, we can substitute for Bt and write the remaining
decision problem over the lBt on the interval [Bk, Bk+1] as:
vB(B) = max
{
log(w1,i0) +B log
(
w2,i0
w1,i0
)
− l0
+
∞∑
t=1
zt
[
log(w1,it) +
(
ψtB¯ + (1− ψ)tB +
t∑
s=0
(1− ψ)t−s−1f(ls)
)
log
(
w2,it
w1,it
)
− lt
]}
. (24)
For given current and future income profiles, (24) is concave in lt for all t, since f is concave.
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Moreover, patience B and all expressions involving lBt appear in separate terms in the sum.
If f is strictly concave, it follows that, given the optimal income profiles, for all t the optimal
lt is unique, and independent of B. Since on the interior of [Bk, Bk+1] the current and future
optimal income profiles are unique, the optimal policy correspondence lB(B) is single-valued.
At the boundary between two intervals there are (by construction of the intervals) at least two
different optimal income profiles for at least one generation, hence lB(B) may take on more than
one optimal value, one corresponding to each optimal set of income profiles. If f (or a segment
of f ) is linear, lB(B) is still generically single-valued on the interior of each interval, as exact
indifference only occurs on a zero-measure subset of the parameter space.
The optimal value function vB over the interval [Bk, Bk+1] is given by (24) with income profiles
it and investment in patience lt fixed at their optimal (and constant) values. (24) is linear in B;
it therefore follows that the value function is piece-wise linear, with each kink corresponding to
the boundary between two of our intervals. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: The law of motion for B, f : [B¯, Bmax]→ [B¯, Bmax], is given by:
Θ(B) = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f (lB (B)) ,
where lB (B) is generically a non-decreasing step function (as described in Proposition 1). Since f
is an increasing function and we assume that ψ < 1, the law of motion Θ(B) is strictly increasing
in B. Notice that Θ(B) may fail to be single-valued for some B. Strictly increasing here means
that Bh < Bl implies B′h < B
′
l for all B
′
h ∈ Θ(Bh) and B′l ∈ Θ(Bl), even if Θ(Bh) or Θ(Bl) is a set.
For a given B0, the law of motion Θ defines (potentially multiple) optimal sequences of patience
{Bt}∞t=0. Any such sequence is a monotone sequence on the compact set [B¯, Bmax], and must
therefore converge. Notice, however, that since l(B) is not single-valued everywhere, different
steady states can be reached even from the same initial B0. If f (or a segment of f ) is linear, the
same results still apply generically, i.e., outside a zero-measure subset of the parameter space.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The strategy is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. The Bellman
equation (5) defines a mapping T on the space of bounded continuous functions on the interval
[A¯, Amax], endowed with the sup norm, where the mapping is given by:
TvA(A) = sup
lA,n
{
log(n) +A(1− n)− lA + z vA(A′)
}
, (25)
where A′ = ψA¯ + (1 − ψ)A + g(lA). Since we assume 0 < z < 1, this mapping is a contraction
by Blackwell’s sufficient conditions, and it therefore has a unique fixed point by the Contraction
Mapping Theorem.
To establish that the value function is increasing, let vA be a non-decreasing bounded continuous
function. We need to show that Th is a non-decreasing function. Choose Ah > Al. We want to
establish that TvB(Ah) > TvB(Al). Since the right-hand side of (25) is the maximization of a
continuous function over a compact set, the maximum is attained. Let l and n be the choices
attaining the maximum for Al. We have:
TvA(Ah) ≥ log(n) +Ah(1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Ah + g(l))
≥ log(n) +Al (1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Al + g(l)) = TvA(Al),
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which is the desired result. Here the first inequality follows because the choice l may not be
maximizing at Ah, and the second inequality follows because Ah > Al and vA is assumed to be
non-decreasing.
To prove that the value function is (weakly) convex, we establish that the operator T preserves
convexity. Let vA be a convex bounded continuous function. We need to establish that Th is also
convex. Choose a number θ such that 0 < θ < 1, let Ah > Al, and let A = θAh + (1 − θ)Al. We
want to show that θTvA(Ah) + (1 − θ)TvA(Al) ≥ TvA(A). Let l and n be choices attaining the
maximum for A. Since these are feasible, but not necessarily optimal choices at Ah and Al, we
have:
TvA(Ah) ≥ log(n) +Ah(1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Ah + g(l)),
T vA(Al) ≥ log(n) +Al(1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Al + g(l)).
Using these inequalities, we have:
θTvA(Ah) + (1− θ)TvA(Al)
≥ θ [log(n) +Ah(1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Ah + g(l))]
+ (1− θ) [log(n) +Al(1− n)− l + z vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Al + g(l))]
= log(n) +A(1− n)− l
+ z
[
θvA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Ah + g(l)) + (1− θ)vA(ψA¯+ (1− ψ)Al + g(l))
]
≥ log(n) +A(1− n)− l + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A− A¯)+ g(l)) = TvA(A),
which is the required condition. The last inequality follows from the assumed convexity of vA.
The operator T therefore preserves convexity, and thus the fixed point must also be convex.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: To prove that lA (A) is a non-decreasing function of A, write first the
program as
vA(A) = sup
lA
{− log(A) +A− 1− lA + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ) (A− A¯)+ g(lA))} .
Next, let l0 = lA (A0) and l1 = lA (A1), where A1 > A0. We want to prove that l1 ≥ l0. To this
aim, observe that
−l0 + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A0 − A¯
)
+ g(l0)) ≥ −l0 + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A0 − A¯
)
+ g(l1))
−l1 + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A1 − A¯
)
+ g(l0)) ≤ −l1 + z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A1 − A¯
)
+ g(l1))
Subtracting the two equations as before, we get:
l1 − l0 ≥
(
z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A0 − A¯
)
+ g(l1))− z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ)
(
A0 − A¯
)
+ g(l0))
)
(26)
− (z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ) (A1 − A¯)+ g(l1))− z vA(A¯+ (1− ψ) (A1 − A¯)+ g(l0)))
(26) implies that l1 ≥ l0. To see why, suppose, to derive a contradiction, that l1 < l0. Then, the left
hand-side would be negative, while the right hand-side would be positive, since vA is increasing
and convex. This would contradict the inequality in (26). Therefore, we must have that l1 ≥ l0.
Hence, lA (A) must be non-decreasing in A.
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The proof of convergence to the steady state is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. Consider
the equilibrium law of motion A′ = Γ (A) where
Γ (A) = ψA¯+ (1− ψ)A+ g (lA (A)) .
Since g is increasing and lA is non-decreasing, Γ (A) is strictly increasing in A. For a given A0, the
law of motion Γ defines (potentially multiple) optimal sequences of patience {At}∞t=0. Any such
sequence is a monotone sequence on the compact set [A¯, Amax], and must therefore converge.
The steady-state expression follows immediately from setting A = Γ (A). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The proposed equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: A positive
fraction of the young adults at time t = 0 invest in patience (at the level lB = l¯B) in expectation of
their children becoming artisans (at time t = 2); the remaining young adults do not invest and set
lB = 0; the agricultural wage is constant from time t = 2 onwards and adjusts so as to equalize
the ex-ante utility of all young adults at time zero; from period t = 2 onwards, preferences
diverge, and the members of the dynasties that did not invest in the first period prefer to be
workers and not to invest in patience, while the members of dynasties that did invest in the first
period prefer to be artisans and to invest in patience at the maximum level lB = l¯B .
We construct the equilibrium in two steps. (i) We derive the equilibrium labor supply µ in agri-
culture from t = 2 onwards (and the corresponding wage) that makes the initial generation just
indifferent between investing and not investing, provided that the equilibrium takes the pre-
scribed form. (ii) We show that condition (16) implies that the prescribed occupational choices
from period t = 2 onwards are indeed optimal.
(i) First notice that since f is linear, conditional on lB > 0 it is (at least weakly) optimal to invest
the maximum amount lB = l¯B . When comparing the utility derived from investing and not
investing, we can disregard the utility that the initial generation derives from consumption and
leisure because of the separable utility function (this component of utility is the same for all first-
generation families). Then, the value of not investing in patience (under the expectation that all
future members of the dynasty will choose to be workers) is given by:
v˜B,F
(
B¯
)
=
z
1− z log
(
αµα−1
)
. (27)
This is simply the discounted utility derived from receiving the worker’s wagewF = αµα−1 from
the next generation on. In contrast, the value of investing in patience (under the expectation that
all future members of the dynasty will choose to be artisans) is:
v˜B,M
(
B¯
)
= −l¯B + z vB,M
(
B¯ + ξl¯B
)
, (28)
where:
vB,M (B) = log(q) +B log(γ)− l¯B + z vB,M
(
ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + ξl¯B
)
.
Notice that the artisan’s utility depends not just on consumption, but also on the cost of investing
l¯B . Solving for vB,M (B) yields:
vB,M (B) =
log(q)− l¯B
1− z +
z
1− z
(
ψB¯ + ξl¯B
)
log(γ)
(1− z (1− ψ)) +
log (γ)
1− z (1− ψ)B.
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Hence,
vB,M
(
B¯ + ξl¯B
)
=
1
1− z
(
log(q)− l¯B + ξl¯B log(γ)1− z (1− ψ) + log (γ) B¯
)
,
which can be substituted into (28) to yield:
v˜B,M
(
B¯
)
= −l¯B + 11− z
(
log(q)− l¯B + ξl¯B log(γ)1− z (1− ψ) + log (γ)B
)
.
For the first generation to be indifferent between investing and not investing, we must have
v˜BA
(
B¯
)
= v˜B,M
(
B¯
)
, which in turn implies (after standard algebra) condition (17) as stated in
the proposition:
log(wF ) = log
(
αµα−1
)
= log(q) + B¯ log(γ)− l¯B
z
+
ξl¯B log(γ)
1− z (1− ψ) .
In addition, the corresponding µ has to satisfy µ < n (where n is equilibrium labor supply),
so that there is a positive fraction of artisans. This condition can always be met by choosing q
sufficiently large.
(ii) We need to ensure that a young adult in period two who is endowed with patience B¯ + ξl¯B
prefers being an artisan to working in agriculture at the flat wage wF , while the opposite is true
for an adult with patience B¯. More formally,
log(q) + B¯ log (γ)− l¯B
z
+
ξl¯B log(γ)
1− z (1− ψ) ≤ log(q) +
(
B¯ + ξl¯B
)
log(γ),
log(q) + B¯ log (γ)− l¯B
z
+
ξl¯B log(γ)
1− z (1− ψ) ≥ log(q) + B¯ log(γ).
These inequalities holds if and only if assumption (16) is satisfied. If these inequalities are satis-
fied, they hold a fortiori for all subsequent generations, because patience increases over time in
artisan dynasties. Q.E.D.
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Parameter Interpretation Value
z Intergenerational Altruism 0.5
A Natural Leisure Appreciation 1.0
φA Level Parameter for Leisure Appreciation 1.5
ξA Curvature Parameter for Leisure Appreciation 0.5
B Natural Patience 0.4
φB Level Parameter for Patience 0.66
ξB Curvature Parameter for Patience 0.5
ψ Depreciation of Preferences 0.5
γ Steepness of Artisan Income Profile 2.0
R Minimum Return of Capitalist Technology 0.35
R Maximum Return of Capitalist Technology 0.42
η Elasticity of Entrepreneurial Return 0.5
δ Depreciation of Capital 0.2
Table 1: Parameter Values for Simulated Economy
50
1752–1799 1800–1849 1850–1899
Church 60 62 38
Land-Owning 14 14 7
Teaching 9 9 12
Law 6 9 14
Administration 3 1 6
Medicine 1 2 7
Banking 0 0 2
Business 0 0 5
Other 7 3 9
Source: Jenkins and Jones (1950), Table 1
Table 2: Professional Choices of Cambridge Graduates, in Percent
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Figure 2: The Value Function for Patience vB(B) and Policy Function lB(B) for Investing
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Figure 3: Capital Accumulation and the Evolution of Patience After the Introduction of
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Technology
